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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

D & L SUPPLY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No,

v.
JOHN SAURINI,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issue in this case on appeal is whether the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment for respondent and against
appellant.

More particularly, the appellant submits the trial

court erred in granting summary judgment since (a) the evidence
on which it was based was inadmissible hearsay evidence; (b) the
evidence is insufficient to show personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.
STATUTES AND RULES APPLICABLE TO THE ISSUES
Rule 803(6), U.R.E., 1983:
Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum,
report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of
acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made
at or near the time by, or from information transmitted
by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity, and if it was
the regular practice of that business activity to make
the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation,

all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other
qualified witness, unless the source of information or
the method or circumstances of preparation indicate
lack of trustworthiness. The term 'business1 as used
in this paragraph includes business, institution,
association, profession, occupation, and calling of
every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
Rule 1002, U.R.E., 1983:
To prove the content of a writing, recording, or
photograph, the original writing, recording, or
photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in
these rules or by other rules adopted by the Supreme
Court of this State or by statute.
§78-27-24, U.C.A., 1953, included in addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, John Saurini, defendant below, appeals from a
summary judgment in favor of respondent D & L Supply granting
judgment against appellant in the sum of $182,435.97.
PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT BELOW
Respondent, plaintiff below, filed suit on August 29, 1985,
in Fourth District Court, seeking damages from the defendant on
account of goods and merchandise sold by the respondent.

(R.l)

Summons was served on appellant in Adams County, Colorado (R.5)
An answer and counterclaim was filed on September 26, 1985 by
appellant through Colorado counsel.

(R.6)

On March 10, 1986,

the respondent moved for summary judgment.

On April 21, 1986,

the trial court granted summary judgment for the respondent in
the sum of $182,435.97.

(R.36)

On May 15, 1986, defendant filed
2

a m o t i o n t o set
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a s i d e t h e summary judgment under Rule 60(1
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on M a y 20 r 19Bt>f the appellant tiled a notice of appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
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iffidavit refi! ^ed
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years,

Leftwich said Ln 198i> he concluded he would no 1 onger do

business with Saurini on a corporate basis and advised him that
Saurini would be personally liable for further orders,

(R.26)

Leftwich said Saurini agreed he would be personally responsible•
(R.27)

Leftwich asserted Saurini had been to Leftwich's place of

business on a number of occasions (R.27) but did not say when.
Leftwich also swore that before every shipment it was agreed
shipments would be made FOB Lindon, Utah, and that payment would
be made at D & L Supply offices in Lindon.
Leftwich's affidavit then states, "I have reviewed the
business records of [D & L] and have determined that total
charges made by [Saurini] personally in November of 1982 to and
including credits given to him in 1984" were in the sum of
$167,842.70 and that the records show $27,523.59 was paid by
Saurini leaving $140,319.11 due.

(R.27)

Interest in the sum of

18% on part and 10% on another part (R.28) provided the claim for
the judgment of $182,435.97. No evidence of the records was
actually introduced nor did Leftwich purport to testify from his
personal knowledge.
The trial judge entered findings of fact and conclusions of
law.

(R. 33)

They were prepared by respondent's counsel and

bear the heading of respondent's counsel.

(R.33)

The findings

of fact recite the material contained in Leftwich's affidavit but
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also contain matter outside the affidavi•

(1 )

otherwise supported

"Shipments were made pursuant to instructions at the

time any such orders were received."
(2)

" I"11«'i I
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shipments were shipped FOB, Lindon, Utah

nippin
"Pursuant t
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made numerous charges from its plant aiid received numerous
payments for ™»r»w of c^ \

shipments pursuant to the agreement at

its offices . Lindon, Utah County, State of Utah."
' •

* * " MI rh '" s df f i d.iv it i ir

embellishments on the matter contained in the affidavit.
April Mf

Summary judgment was entered

( I • 1 in i 1 i
appeal, but w a s based oi i a cl a

1986,
ii *I

(R. w.|
in 11 in in I i

-i excusable neglect to answer

the affidavit of respondent.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The affidavit rel led on in the trial court by respondent for
summary judgment

insufficient

support summary judgment

because it contc

hearsay evic -;:. *-
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personal knowledge of the declarant, and violates the best
evidence rule.
In addition, the affidavit for summary judgment did not
present adequate evidence to show a basis for personal
jurisdiction of the trial court over the appellant.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
SINCE: (A) THE EVIDENCE ON WHICH IT WAS BASED WAS
INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY EVIDENCE; (B) THE EVIDENCE IS
INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW PERSONAL JURISDICTION OF THE
DEFENDANT.
A.

It is well settled that summary judgment must be based

on admissible evidence.

Hearsay evidence or evidence that is

otherwise inadmissible cannot be the basis for summary judgment.
Norton v. Blackham. 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983); Durham v. Maraetts,
571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977); Preston v. Lamb. 20 Utah 2d 260, 436
*P.2d 1021 (1968); Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp.. 29
Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 638 (1973).

An affidavit not based on the

personal knowledge of the affiant and setting forth admissible
evidence and showing affiant can testify to matters in the
affidavit will not support a summary judgment.

Western States

Thrift & Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019
(1972); Rainford v. Rytting, 22 Utah 2d 252, 253, 451 P.2d 769
(1969); Triloaaan v. Trilocrcran. 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985).
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In Walker v, Rockv Mountain Recreation Corp,, supra, this
Court observed:
"The opposing affidavit submitted by defendant did not
comport with the requirements of Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P.,
i.e., such an affidavit must be made on personal
knowledge of the affiant, and set forth facts that
would be admissible in evidence and show that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated
therein. Statements made merely on information and
belief will be disregarded. Hearsay and opinion
testimony that would not be admissible if testified to
at the trial may not properly be set forth in an
affidavit."
It is submitted in this case the affidavit of Jack Leftwich
(R.26) is wholly deficient to support the summary judgment for
DfitL Supply because it did not contain admissible evidence as to
the right to recover any amount.

Leftwich states he has reviewed

the business records of plaintiff and the business records of the
corporation showed a particular charges to have been made.
Leftwich's affidavit was based on records not admitted in
evidence or included with the motion for summary judgment.

Nor

did the affidavit show any foundation for the admissibility of
the records.
Rule 602, Utah Rules of Evidence, 1983 (U.R.E.), provides,
"A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is
introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal
knowledge of the matter."

The affidavit of Leftwich (R.26) on
7

the issue of the amount due and owing D & L Supply does not
purport to rely on the personal knowledge of Leftwich but upon
the records of the corporation.

However, the copies of the

corporate records are not included.

Thus, the records, not

Leftwich's personal knowledge, were the basis of the judgment.
The records were hearsay.

Rule 801(c), U.R.E.

"'Hearsay1 is a

statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted."

See State v. Sutton, 707 P.2d 681 (Utah

1981); State v. Gray. 777 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986); Utah Dept. of
Transportation v. Jones, 694 P.2d 1031 (Utah 1984).
In this case the records are clearly hearsay.

Although Rule

803(6), U.R.E., 1981, provides an exception for business records,
that rule applies only when the records themselves are offered.
In this case the evidence is hearsay on hearsay.

Nor does the

affidavit suffice to establish the admissibility of the records
under Rule 803(6) had the records been offered.

There is no

showing the records in this case were kept in the "regularly
conducted" business of D & L Supply.

Nor is there foundation

that the records were made "at or near the time" of the
recording.

There is no testimony of the records custodian or

other qualified witness as to the methods by which the records
were accumulated or kept.

Therefore, the affidavit is wholly
8

deficient to establish the required foundation for the
admissibility of the records.

The "additional requirements" to

establish foundation were not presented in the affidavit.

See

State v. Sutton, 707 P.2d at 683. See also, State v. Long,
P.2d

, 36 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (1986), where this Court found the

foundation insufficient to support the admissibility of official
records.
Recently, in United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184 (7th Cir.
1986), the importance of showing the foundation for admission of
business records was discussed.

The Court said:

"The idea behind Rule 803(6) is that when a record is
kept with sufficient regularity, the existence of an
entry (or the absence of one) is good evidence that the
thing took place. . . . Business records are reliable
to the extent they are compiled consistently and
conscientiously." Id. p. 192.
The foundation to establish reliability is clearly lacking
in this case.
Finally, Leftwich's affidavit (R.26) as to what D & L
Supply's records showed violated the best evidence rule. The
affiant was specifically addressing the contents of a record.
Under such circumstances, the records themselves are the best
evidence of their contents.

Rule 1002, U.R.B., 1983; McCormick,

Evidence, 3d Ed. §§ 230-231. There is no showing the records
could not be made available nor were copies offered.
9

C.f., Meyer

v. General American Hospital Corp,, 659 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Utah
1977) . Under such circumstances, the affidavit violated the best
evidence rule.

Intermountain Farmers Ass'n v. Fitzgerald, 574

P.2d 1162 (Utah 1978) (reading of material contained in exhibits
not admissible violates best evidence rule)•

In Interna.

Harvester Credit v. Pioneer Tractor, 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981),
plaintiff brought an action to recover amounts due on a corporate
obligation.

The Court held the best evidence rule was violated

where oral summaries of documents were presented.
such summaries must be reduced to writing.

The Court said

Also, the court found

insufficient foundation to establish admissibility under the
business records doctrine.
Based on the evidence of record, respondent was not entitled
to summary judgment because there was no admissible evidence
supporting the amount due, if any.
B.

The evidence was insufficient to support summary

judgment for D & L Supply because there is an issue of fact as to
whether there was sufficient jurisdiction over the defendant John
Saurini.

The facts make it clear from the pleadings that

defendant is a resident of Colorado.

(R.l)

The defendant

expressly denied he had engaged in any "transaction of business
within the State of Utah," and "not subjected himself to any
jurisdiction of" the Utah courts.

Since jurisdiction was
10

contested, the respondent was obligated as a part of its motion
for summary judgment to show a basis for the court to exercise
jurisdiction.

Mabud v.Pakistan International Airlines,

, 33 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (1986) (on rehearing).

P.2d

It was incumbent

upon the respondent to show "minimum contacts" sufficient to
support jurisdiction.

78-27-24, U.C.A., 1953; Synergetics v.

Marathon Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985).
The defendant did not contract to supply services or goods
in this State.

78-27-24(2), U.C.A., 1953.

See Mailory

Engineering, Inc. v. Ted R. Brown & Associates, Inc., 618 P.2d
1004 (Utah 1980); Burt Drilling, Inc. v. Potadrill, 608 P.2d 244
(Utah 1980).

The affidavit of Leftwich shows only conversations

that Saurini may have had with Leftwich agreeing to be personally
bound as to shipments.

The conversations are not set forth only

the legal conclusion.

There is a statement that Saurini has been

to plaintiff's place of business, but there is no showing his
presence was to conduct business or that his presence was related
to the claims in this case.

The only other allegation is that

payment on shipments would be made to plaintiff's offices in
Lindon, Utah.

These allegations are insufficient to establish

the factual basis for jurisdiction where jurisdiction was not
admitted and was contested.

There is no showing any of the

contracts were entered into in Utah.
11

Utah Synergetics ex rel.

Laneer Indust. Inc. v. Marathon Ranching Co,. 701 P.2d 1106 (Utah
1985).
In Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco, Inc.. 610 P.2d 1307 (Utah
1980), this Court held activities more than those alleged and
shown in this case were insufficient to establish jurisdiction
under Utah's Long Arm Statute, 78-27-24, U.C.A., 1953.

The court

held the "jurisdictional facts" had to provide a basis for the
court's judgment.

Id. 1309. The Court noted where jurisdiction

is contested, the plaintiff must establish the basis for
jurisdiction.

The facts in this case do not show that Saurini's

presence in Utah was related to the actual contracts or accounts
sued on, do not show they were negotiated in Utah, the supplies
were to be provided appellant in Colorado, only payment was to be
made to D & L in Utah.

The litigation must be related to the

acts of the defendant and the litigation must arise out of those
activities.

Id. 1311. The allegations in the Leftwich affidavit

do not support jurisdiction, or at least leave the matter
incomplete for the purposes of summary judgment.

To allow

jurisdiction on the showing in this case would allow jurisdiction
over every out-of-state purchase from a business in Utah even if
by mail or telephone.
The affidavit supporting D & L's motion does not cover the
jurisdiction issue by showing facts sufficient to establish the
12

respondent's right to summary judgment.
deficient and conclusionary.

The affidavit itself is

There is a conflict between the

affidavit and the answer of the appellant.

Under such

circumstances, the granting of summary judgment was improper.
Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (Utah 1985); Olwell v. Clark,
658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982).

The findings of fact, prepared by

counsel for the trial judge, cannot enlarge on the evidence.
Summary judgment was improper.
CONCLUSION
Summary judgment in this case was improper.

The affidavit

of the plaintiff's president was not based on admissible
evidence.

A summary based on inadmissible and improper evidence

cannot stand.
In addition, the issue of jurisdiction was contested in this
case and the affidavit of respondent was incomplete to resolve
the jurisdictional issue and based on conclusions. Therefore,
there was no basis for summary judgment and this Court should
reverse and remand for trial.
Respectfully submitted,

William J. Cayias
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM
Affidavit of Jack Leftwich (R. 26)
Robert L. Moody, #2302
CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR & MOODY
Attorneys for Plaintiff
55 East Center Street
P.O. Box 1466
Provo, UT 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-27
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
D & L SUPPLY,
Plaintiff,

A F F I D A V I T

vs.
Civil No. 70,513

JOHN SAURINI,
Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH
County of Utah

)
) ss.
)

JACK LEFTWICH, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as
follows:
1.

That I am president of the Plaintiff corporation.

2.

That for more than 20 years I have been acquainted with

and have done business with the Defendant John Saurini both as an
individual and to corporations that he has either owned or been
associated with.
14

3.

In 1982, I concluded that I would no longer do business

with the Defendant on a corporate basis and advised him that any
further orders placed would have to be done by him personally and
he would have to be personally responsible for payment of any and
all materials shipped from the State of Utah.
4.

That after conversing with the Defendant about being

personally responsible, he stated that he would agree to pay
personally for any and all materials and would place orders and
direct where they were to be shipped.
5.

The Defendant John Saurini has been to Plaintiff's

place of business in Lindon, Utah on a number of occasions.
6.

Before each and every shipment was made, it was agreed

that the shipments would be made FOB Lindon, Utah and that
payment would be made to Plaintiff's offices in Lindon, Utah.
7.

I have reviewed the business records of the Plaintiff

and have determined that total charges made by the Defendant from
the time that we began doing business with the Defendant
personally in November of 1982 to and including credits given to
him in 1984 show that there were charges made in the total sum of
ONE HUNDRED SIXTY SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY TWO and
70/100 ($167,842.70) DOLLARS.

The business records of the

corporation further show that payments were made during the same
period of time in the sum of TWENTY SEVEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
15

TWENTY THREE and 59/100 ($27,523.59) DOLLARS.

There is a total

principal balance owing in the sum of ONE HUNDRED FORTY THOUSAND
THREE HUNDRED NINETEEN and 11/100 ($140,319.11) DOLLARS.
8.

Our business records show that computing interest at

eighteen (18%) percent as was the terms and conditions of the
early invoices show that interest at eighteen (18%) percent on
the charges made total EIGHTY ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIX and
77/100 ($81,306.77) DOLLARS.

During the period of shipment, we

increased the interest to twenty four (24%) percent.
9.

Interest has been calculated on the balance owing on

Plaintiff's account at the rate of ten (10%) percent which I am
advised is the legal rate and interest calculated on the unpaid
balance at ten (10%) percent totals FORTY THOUSAND FORTY NINE
($42,049.86) DOLLARS.
DATED this 10th day of March, 1986.

/s/ Jack Leftwich
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

day of March,

1986.

/s/ Claire Jones Clarke
NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:
December 4, 1989

Residing at Provo Utah
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78-27-24,

Jurisdiction over nonresidents—Acts submitting

person to jurisdiction.

Any person, notwithstanding section 16-

10-102, whether or not a citizen

or resident of this state, who

in person or through an agent does any of the following
enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his
personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of
this state as to any claim arising from:
(1)

The transaction of any business within this state;

(2)

Contracting to supply services or goods in this state;

(3)

The causing of any injury within this state whether

tortious or by breach of warranty;
(4)

The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate

situated in this state;
(5)

Contracting to insure any person, property or risk

located within this state at the time of contracting;
(6)

With respect to actions of divorce and separate

maintenance, the maintenance in this state of a matrimonial
domicile at the time the claim arose or the commission in this
state of the act giving rise to the claim; or
(7)

The Commission of sexual intercourse within this state

which gives rise to a paternity suit under Chapter 45a, Title 78,
to determine paternity for the purpose of establishing
responsibility for child support.
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